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DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS UNDER THE
EGYPTIAN CIVIL SERVICE LEGAL SYSTEM:




The bilateral judicial system has been established firmly within the
Egyptian legal system. Various administrative law courts of the Council
of the State (the "Council") are now entrusted with resolving all adminis-
trative law disputes' arising out of government activities. The Council has
gained its judicial power over administrative law disputes gradually and
through constant and steady developments.
2 
The Judicial Division of the
*Associate Professor of Law, Yarsouk University, Jordan, and Head of the Department of
Public Adsministration. A visiting professor at the University of Virginia Law School. B.A.
Damascus University Law School, 1967; L.L.M., Cairo University Law School, 1969; Higher
Diploma in Public Administraton, United Nations Regional Institute, 1973; Ph.D. Wales
University School of Law, 1983.
My thanks am due to Professor Marshall J. Berger, Chairman, Administrative Conference
of the United States and to Mr. Jeffrey Lubbers of the same Administrative Conference;
Professor Harold Ken; Professor David Martin, Mr. Kent Olson, and Mr. Mac Warner of the
University of Virginia Law School; Major Kasey Warner of the Judge Advocates General
School and to Mrs, Joan Ginde Rumfelt. Their insightful comments and sincere help were of
eminent value.
The views expressed in this article are, however, only my views, not necessarily theirs.
1. These disputes should be distinguished from bsiness-like activities of the State. In
addition, acts of state are not within the scope of administrative law disputes. Acts of state are
shaped with political considerations. They are, therefore, precluded from judicial review. See
infra text accompanying note 13.
2. The Council of the State was established in 1946. Its jurisdiction was very limited. Its
judicial structure was confined only to one administrative court See infra text accompanying
notes 8, 1I.
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Council has become an equivalent counterpart to the judicial pyramid of
the ordinary courts. The Council, through its different levels of courts and
its other organs,' attempts to strike a clear demarcation between administra-
tive law activities of the government and its business activities. Distinction
between these activities is a fundamental question of administrative law in
a bilateral judicial system. Settling this question may eliminate jurisdic-
tional conflicts between ordinary and administrative law courts. It may lay
down principles of law that are peculiar to administrative law disputes.
Formulating a firm solution for this conundrum has never been a complete
success or an easy task.
4 
The High Court' was established to deal with
anticipated questions of jurisdictional conflict.
The main emphasis of this article is civil servants' disciplinary actions
under the Egyptian legal system. The Civil servants' activities are
connected with public utilities. Heads of public utilities direct civil
servants to maintain good services. Multifarious regulatory authorities with
overlapping jurisdictions are established to improve the standard of public
services. Some important examples of those authorities are the Central
Agency for Management and Administration, the States Delegate Office,
the Administrative Deputy Agency, and the Civil Service Affairs Central
Committee.
The Egyptian disciplinary legal system has undergone a thorough
legislative review to eliminate inefficiency and to maintain job security.'
It has shifted from a purely administrative system to an elaborate, almost
judicial, disciplinary system. Disciplinary courts within the Council have
become disciplinary authorities that are empowered to impose penalties on
civil service employees. These courts and the High Administrative Court
are also authorized to review disciplinary decisions made by administrative
authorities. Nevertheless, these disciplinary courts have no jurisdiction
over adverse acts of public administration other than strict disciplinary
actions. The former actions are within the purview of the administrative
judicial court and other administrative courts.
7
3. Council of the State Act, No. 47, art. 2 (1972) (Egypt).
4. See MUstrAcA WAsei, ADMNsTRATvE PROCsDUmAL Ruis 1-66 (2nd ed. 1972); see also infta
text accompanying notes 12-15.
5. This court is a constiinional court and a Court of Conflict. It is completely separate from
ordinary courts and administrative law courts. It is wholly different from the High Administra-
tive Cout, which sits at the top of the administrative law courts pyramid. See infra text
accompanying notes 30, 63.
6. See generally SULYMAN TAMAsct, DIsctPLINARY OFeENs: A CoMPARAIVE STUDY (1975).
7. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, arts. 13-15.
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Although the disciplinary legal system has been improved, its
framework is far from stable. Certain improvements are needed to foster
job security. Cases involving serious disciplinary penalties merit further
consideration. Furthermore, since efficiency is the primary goal of a
rational disciplinary system, public authorities should not be hindered by
formality and complexity.
This Article analyzes principal disciplinary issues of general concern.
It moves from a theoretical discussion to a close examination of practical
disciplinary disputes argued before the judicial division of the Council.
Section II views the administrative law courts and their role from a
constitutional perspective. The types, procedures, and jurisdictions of
disciplinary courts are explored. Administrative law disputes are explained.
Distinction is made between these activities and other govemment activities
in light of the prevailing administrative law theory. The bilateral judicial
system is then evaluated. Reference is made to other bilateral legal
systems, including the French administrative law experiment. A compari-
son is made between bilateral and unitary legal systems.
Section III addresses the duties, responsibilities, official offenses, and
disciplinary penalties of civil servants. This section also deals with civil
service regulatory authorities and their diverse duties and interrelated roles.
An assessment is made at the end of the section.
Section IV examines disciplinary law cases in light of court decisions.
The judicial disciplinary policy followed by the High Administrative Court
is explored in light of legislative mandates, which are undergoing constant
change.
This Article concludes that drastic shifts toward a purely judicial
disciplinary system may be at the expense of efficiency and flexibility of
good administration. Administrative authorities should not be deprived of
their supervisory role over subordinate officials. At the same time, a
subordinate official is also entitled to further protection. Abuse of
discretion must not be allowed.
II. THE COUNCIL OF THE STATE APPARATUS AND ITS ROLE:
A CONSTITUTIONAL OUTLOOK
Egypt has had a bilateral judicial system since 1946.' Ordinary courts
of justice' have jurisdiction over private and civil litigation, including
8. Council of the State Act, No. 112 (1946) (Egypt).
9. Ordinary Couns of justice include: Conciliation Courts, Courts of First instance (District
Courts), Appellate Courts, and the Court of Cassation. The Court of Cassation sits at the top
of the ordinayt judicial pyramid as the highest ordinaty court.
N.YI. SCH. I. INTL & CoMP. L.
government business.' t The Council, however, has become the sole arbiter
with respect to acts of public administration, which are carried out by
public administration authorities acting in their capacities as public
powers.
11
An act of public administration may be characterized as an administra-
tive act, and not as a private governmental one, if it satisfies certain
conditions. For example, it must be carried out by the executive branch
of the state, but not in its political or governmental capacity. Thus,
government dealings with foreign countries concerning diplomatic or
military activities, or its relationship with the legislature with respect to
legislative processes, ae beyond the domain of administrative activities.'
Such acts are shaped with political considerations. Therefore, the
government acts in a political rather than in an administrative capacity. 3
Government activities of this nature are called "acts of state." Conse-
quently, they are not within the purview of administrative law courts. 4 In
10. Private and civil litigation includes all disputes involving private individuals, which may
arise as a result of their dealings with each other. The teras also embrace disputes involving
public administration, which may anse as a result of the activities with private individuals and
companies when a public auttority chooses to act, or is required to act, in a business-like
capacity. Public administration in such dealings stands as a private actor, and the other party
to such activity is equal to public administration in rights and obligations. Private law activities
are discharged by equal parties and without any regard to their official status. Disputes arising
ot of such activities are, accordingly, solved by ordinary courts in countries that follow a
bilateral judicial system. See WASFt, supra note 4, at 86-91.
11. When the Council was established in 1946, it consisted of only ajudiial dministration
court, which had a very limited jurisdiction. In 1952, Judicial Committees were established
within the Council In 1954, these commitees were replaced by administrative courts, which
also had a very limited jurisdiction. In 1955, the jurisdietion of the Council expanded and the
High Administrative Court was established. The Council's jurisdiction over administrative law
disputes, however, was not complete. The Council has steadily evolved. Today, it has become
the sole judge in all administrative acts of public administration. See TU'AYMAH AL-JARF,
ADmaisTRAnvE JUDIctAL REVIEw OF PuBuc ADsaMrsRATION ACtION, 5-20, 3t-5 (1977); see ifta
text accompanying notes 19-63.
12. In Egypt, the most compelling political acts of the Executive am not within the
jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
13. In America, cortes of justice do not review political questions. Matiry v. Madison, I
Cr. 137, 170 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall declared: "Questions in their nature political, or
which am, by the Constitution and Laws, submitted to the Executive, can never be made in this
Court." Id.; see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1(1849); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939);
Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S. 138 (1948); PAUL M. BATOR cc AL, HART & WBHcER'S: TuE FEDERAL
Osurs AND TBE FDERAL SYsmt% 22094 (Mu ed. 195M GAL Glawtc, CAses ANT MATudas ON
CoNsrmITnorNAL LAW (9thed. 1975); C.G. Post, THE SUREE COURT AND POLImCAL QUSTIONS
(1936); JosEam STORY, tlonEIARris ON THE ONSTrnTON ON Te CoNSTmyioN O "HE U.S. (1987)
LAWRENE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 1988).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 22-2ti.
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addition, the act must be closely connected with public utilities. Acts of
public administration that do not meet this condition are considered private
acts of public administration." Lastly, the act must be carried out by the
public administration in its capacity as a public power. In its capacity it
must be distinguished from the other party dealing with it. In such
activities the administration is equipped with certain powers and becomes
superior. It can impose its will or certain obligations upon the other party
for maintaining public services. But, if the public administration was not
privileged with certain powers, or if it chooses to deal with individuals in
a businesslike method, its act is considered a private act that lies within the
jurisdictional province of ordinary courts, even though it is closely related
to public services.
16
The bilateral judicial system has been completely integrated into the
Egyptian legal system. Subsequent constitutions have provided that the
Council is an independent judicial agency, which is authorized to resolve
administrative disputes of public administration.
7 Based upon such
constitutional mandates, subsequent acts have expanded the jurisdiction of
the Council.'" The Council performs judicial, legislative, and consultative
functions. In order to fulfill its duties, the Council is divided into three
major divisions: the Judicial Division, the Legal Opinion Division, and the
Legislative Division.
9
A. The Judicial Division of the Council
The Council discharges its judicial function through the High
Administrative Court, the Judicial Administrative Court, administrative
courts, disciplinary courts, and the state delegates office."
In accordance with the constitutional provision that established the
Council as an independent judicial agency,
2' the Council of the State Act
of 1972 conferred on the Council exclusive jurisdiction to review all public
15. See supra note 10; see supra text accompanying note 12.
16. For mom details see WASI, supra note 4; A L-JARF, supra note 11.
17. 1980 CONST. OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT ast. 192. The article states that "[tthe
Council of the State is an independentjudicial agency. It is authorized to resolve administrative
disputes and disciplinay cases of public administration. The Act of the Council of the State
deternines the other duties of the Council." Id.
18. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 2. It should be noted that this act, with some
modifications, is still in force.
19. Id.
20. Id. art. 3.
21. See 1980 CONST. OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 192, supra note 17.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L.
administrative acts, including government contracts, disciplinary cases,
public property determinations, and public order and public safety
disputes.' Accordingly, the Council has absolute jurisdiction to review the
validity of acts of public administration as well as the power to entertain
compensation claims raised against public administration.
This Act, however, precludes judicial review for certain governmental
acts. Legislative provisions that preclude judicial review of certain
administrative actions' have resulted in fierce battles and numerous
opinions. Article 12 of the Council of the State Act of 1959 provides that
"[t]he Council has no jurisdiction to entertain disputes related to acts of
State." This article then states that "[d]ischarge and dismissal of civil
servants by the President of the Republic for reasons other than disci-
plinary ones are considered as acts of State."
The Council struggled over the effect of this preclusion clause with
respect to the scope of judicial review of administrative action and the
judicial jurisdiction of the Council.' The Council tackled this question
with considerable caution and reluctance. The Judicial Administrative
Court allowed claims against dismissal by the president, notwithstanding
the Act's plain statement that no further judicial review was allowed against
such acts. It decided that the complainant was entitled to compensation to
redress injuries. Nevertheless, it unequivocally decided that it had no
jurisdiction to quash these acts.'
The High Administrative Court, however, rejected the opinion of the
Judicial Administrative Court. It held that administrative courts are
precluded from reviewing such acts. Furthermore, it ascertained that
administrative courts cannot entertain or quash compensation claims related
to these acts.
The views of Egyptian jurists concerning the preclusion clause is also
far from unanimous. Most of them support the attitude of the Judicial
Administrative Court and criticize the High Administrative Court's
inflexible opinion.' Other jurists subscribe to the High Administrative
22. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 10.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
24. Compare with 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988), which states that "This chapter applies,
according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that t. ntattes prec/ode judicial review;
or 2. agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." id.
25. 8 Judicial Administrative Coot, No.5999 (1956); see aLsoAL-JARFsapra note t1,at 120.
26. 3 High Administrative Court No. 925 (1958); 10 High Administrative Court No. 1205
(1965).
27. AL-JARF, supra note 11, at 102-29.
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Court's opinion. The latter prefer to follow the letter of the Act, but not
its Spirit.
2
The permanent constitution has resolved the dispute in favor of the
principles of natural justice and the prevailing view of the jurists. Article
68 states that "[e]very individual has the right of access to the judiciary.
This right is guaranteed. No provision in any Act of Parliament will




Accordingly, preclusion provisions are explicitly considered unconsti-
tutional. The Constitutional Court (the High Court) has declared that such
legislative enactments are of no legal effect and has annulled them.' Any
act of public administration made thereunder, will therefore, be held
invalid. The Council of the State Act of 1972 does not include the debated
paragraph.
3
' The High Administrative Court, in its new rulings, has struck
down acts of public administration based on provisions similar to the above
debated one."
1. The High Administrative Court
The High Administrative Court, which was established in 1955, is
located in Cairo.
33 It is the highest appellate administrative court that is
authorized to review decisions of the administrative judicial court,
administrative courts, and disciplinary courts.' The Court reviews these
decisions according to a specified procedure.
35
28. See AL Es-B CcNsr orrUTuAL REVstW O1 Acts Or PARL[AMsET IN FiYFT 48245 (1978.
On the queston of"the prelusion clause" in the United States of Ametica, see generally
Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV.
642 (1967); Kenneth C. Davis, No Law To Apply, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1988); Ronald M.
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990);
Harvey Saferstita, Nonreviewabiliry: A Functional Analysis Of Committed To Agency
Discretion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
29. PERMANENT CONST. OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 68.
30. AL-JARF, supra note 11, at 124; EL-BAZ, supra note 28, at 482,
31. Article II of the named Act states that "courts of the Council have no jurisdiction to
review acts of state." Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art 11.
32. AL-JARF, supra note 11, at 124.
33. Concil of the State Act, No.165 (1955) (Egypt).
34. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 23.
35. Appeals shall be raised by a person who has a locus standi. The administrative attorney
general shall be notified. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 22. It should be noted
that procedural rules followed by the Council am distinct from those followed by the ordinary
courts of justice.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
2. The Administrative Judicial Court
The Administrative Judicial Court is also located in Cairo. 36 It may
hold sessions in other regions of the Republic by its chiefs decision3 The
court has primary jurisdiction over all administrative law cases except for
those cases within the jurisdiction of administrative courts or disciplinary
courts. It should be remembered that the Administrative Judicial Court is
considered, in these cases, a court of fist instance. Its decisions can be
reviewed, on appeal, by the High Administrative Court.t The Administra-




Administrative courts are located in Cairo and Alexandria.4" The
president of the Council may establish other administrative courts in any
region or regions of the state.4' An administrative court may be authorized
to review administrative disputes concerning a government unit or units as
determined by the president of the Council.42 An administrative court has
jurisdiction over a limited number of administrative law cases. It is
authorized to entertain claims of public officials of a lesser category43
questioning decisions of appointments, as well as disputes regarding
monthly salary determinations and retirement pensions.4 4  It is also
authorized to review claims against termination of service and suspension
from work in cases not of a disciplinary nature. 4' Furthermore, an adminis-
trative court is authorized to solve disputes arising out of concession and
public works contracts, but within certain limits.
46
36. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 4.
37. Id. art. 13.
38. Courts' decisions of the Council can be reviewed before the High Administrative Court
on one of various grounds: violation of law, substantial procedural defect, or a court decision
that contradicts he doctrine of res judicata Id. art. 23.
39. Id.
40, Id. art. 5
41. cd.
42. id. art. 6.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
44 Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 14.
45. Id.
46. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 14. The article states that an administrative





47 are specialized courts. They have jurisdiction
only over employee disciplinary issues.
4 
Disciplinary courts have a dual,
but specialized and interwoven role. In certain cases, disciplinary courts
are empowered to impose disciplinary penalties upon public officials. In
this capacity, they are considered disciplinary authorities. Their decisions
may be reviewed, on appeal, before the High Administrative Court. A
court's decision may be struck down by the latter court on certain grounds
of review.
4 
The other role of the disciplinary courts is to review decisions
made by disciplinary authorities. In this capacity, a disciplinary court is
considered as an appellate avenue. It may quash disciplinary decisions
made by administrative authorities on any ground of review of adminis-
tration action.
'
Explicit disciplinary decisions are exclusively within the jurisdiction
of disciplinary courts. Administrative law disputes other than express
disciplinary penalties are within the exclusive province of the other
administrative law courts of the Council.' Thus, the High Administrative
Court ruled that adverse actions against civil servants, other than disciplin-
ary penalties, must be reviewed by the Administrative Judicial Court but
not by disciplinary courts. The High Administrative Court ascertained that
acts of public administration, such as transfer and reassignment, are not
within the competence of disciplinary courts.
2 Although a transfer
decision may be used by a superior official as a pretext to punish an
innocent official, the Court held that such an act is not within the penalties
is not mote than 500 pounds. Id.
47. Discipinary Court were established in 1972. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21;
see also Administrative Deputy and Disciplinary Proceedings Act, No. 117, art. 18 (1958)
(Egypt). Before the establishment of disciplinary courts, important disciplinary disputes were
solved through disciplinary councils which consisted of two members of the Council of the
State and two officers chosen from the Accountancy Council or the Civil Service Council.
Until 1972, those disciplinary councils were not part of the Judicial Division of the Council
or part of the judiciary.
48. Council of the State Act, sapra note 3, art. 15.
49. See Council of the State Act, No. 165 (1955) (Egypt).
50. Grounds of review of administrative action are lack of jurisdiction, violating the law oM
applying it incorrectly, substantial procedural defect, and abuse of power. Council of the State
Act, supra note 3, art. 10. See also ALJARF, supra note 11, at 234-84.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
52. 27 High Administrative Con No. 3359 (1983). See also infra text accompanying notes
165-72.
1991]
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stated in the Civil Service Employees Act.
3 
The interested official,
accordingly, should raise a case before the administrative judicial court and
not before the disciplinary courts.
There are two types of disciplinary courts.' The first type of
disciplinary court has jurisdiction over disciplinary actions involving
officials of the highest category." The second type has jurisdiction over
disciplinary disputes involving officials of lesser categories."6
Both types of courts are independent of each other. Their determina-
tions can be reviewed only by the High Administrative Court. Disciplinary
courts for high ranking officials are located in both Cairo and Alexandria.
The court's determinations are made by a panel of three judges. Disciplin-
ary courts for lesser officials are also located in Calm and Alexandria."
The president of the Council, however, may establish disciplinary courts
in other regions of the country." The president also determines the courts'
territorial jurisdictions, their numbers, and the government units that lie
within the province of a certain disciplinary court."
However, conflicts between disciplinary courts may arise. A
disciplinary case may involve officials from different ranks. In such cases,
the dispute must be referred to the concerned disciplinary court authorized
to entertain disciplinary disputes involving the high ranking officer.6'
Territorial jurisdiction is determined according to the place where the
offense was committed.' Similarly, a disciplinary dispute involving
officials from different government units shall be resolved by the disciplin-
ary court located in the area in which the offense was committed.' Other
cases of jurisdictional conflict are resolved by the Council president.'
53. See infra text accompanying notes 84, 85.
54. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 7. See also infra text accompanying notes
81-82. To distinguish between these two types of cous, disciplinary courts for the highest
category are sometimes entided high disciplinary courts. But this title is misleading because
both courts are equal in their official status. Their personnel jurisdiction, however, is
detenuined according to officials' ranks.
55. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 7.
56. Id.
57. Id. art. 8.
58. Id.
59. Id. art. 7.
60. Id.
61. Id. art. 17.
62. Id. art. 18.
63. Id.
64. Id. arts. 17- 18. See Administrative Deputy and Disciplinary Proceedings Act, supra note
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5. The Delegates of the State Office
The Delegates of the State Office are one of the fundamental units
within the Judicial Division of the Council. Its legal staff acts on behalf
of the state in administrative law cases' involving government agencies.
Senior officials of this office are usually known as councilors. Councilors,
assistant councilors, deputies, and representatives of this office discharge
the duties assigned to them by their director. The head of the Office is
appointed by the president of the Council and acts as the presidents
deputy.'
B. The Legal Opinion Division
The Legal Opinion Division is another major division of the Council.
It consists of various units. Those units are managed by councilors or
assistant councilors. They are attached to government units to carry out
the duties of the division concerning those units.
67 Councilors of these
units are directly accountable before the Council.' The Council, through
its legal opinion division, has exclusive authority to give opinions with
regard to matters related to the interpretation of the Civil Service Employ-
ees Act and the application of its roles and principles.
69 The legal opinion
must be sought from the unit attached to the concerned ministry. An
application to this effect must be made by the concerned ministry through
the Central Agency for Management and Administration.'
e
47, art 24; I FAI- zzAT, DmzARY AuncooT uscasEo PALAC AMNrt AND IE CsRs
523 (lst ed. 1980).
65. Disciplinary disputes ae excluded from the jurisdiction of this office. In disciplinary
cases the government is repesented by an administrative atoney or deputy acting within the
Administrative Deputy Agency, which is exclusively authorized to investigate and prosecute
disciplinary offenses within the civil service. See Administrative Deputy and Disciplinary
Proceedings Act, supra note 47, ars. 3, 4; see also infra text accompanying notes 102-8.
66 Counucil of the State Act, supra note 3, at 7.
67 Id. ar. 40.
68. Id. art. 42.
69. Civil Service Employees Act, No. 47, art. 6 (1978) (Egypt).
70. Id. This complex procedure for obtaining legal opinion, it would seem, is intended to
maintain the role of the central agency with respect to civil service activities. One also would
assume the framers of this prevision intended to achieve consistency within the civil service.
Nevertheless, these purposes can be achieved without resorting to this long process. The
Cocuil may be directly empowered to carry out this duty, and the opinion of the Corncil may
be conveyed, without further channels, to the Central Agency.
373
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L. [Vol. 12
The Legal Opinion Division and the Legislative Division have a
general board" that is headed by one of the deputies of the Council
president. The board includes heads of both divisions, their assistants, and
heads of their different units. It is authorized to give opinions concerning
international, constitutional, legislative, and other legal issues that may be
referred to the board by the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the
National Assembly, the prime minister, any minister, or the president of the
Council." It is also authorized to give opinions concerning disputes that
may arise between ministries, public agencies, and local government
authorities.73 The opinion of the general board is authoritative and binding
on the govemment units that are parties to the dispute.'4
71, Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 43.
72, Id. art. 66(a). In a unitary judicial system, such as that of the United States of America,
the situation is wholly different. Courts ofjussce repeatedly ascertained that it is their duty to
withhold advisory opinions from the Executive. In his reply of August 8, 1793, to President
George Washington concerning the construction of certain treaties with foreign countries, Chief
Jutice Jay stated that:
These ... considerations .. afford strong arguments against the propriety of our
extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to, especially as the power given by
the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for
opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly united to the Executive
departments ....
CHARIS WAaRnE, I THE SUPRtE CORJT IN UIMiTWn STATESHTORY 1789-1835, at 110-I 1 (1987);
see also BATOR, supra note 13, at 65-72.
Advisory opinions, however, must be distinguished from declaratory judgments, An
advisory opinion is an interpretation for a certain legal issue that does nut constitute a dispute
between parties before a court. It is a legal opinion not binding upon any party- A declaratory
judgment, on the other hand, is a true judicial decision. It is binding upon the parties in a
dispute. When it is declared, a declaratory decision becomes a resjudicata one. it establishes
a precedent that should be followed in similar, future cases. See, e.g,, Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934);
Aetna Life Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 512, 48 Star.
955 (1934). See also WARREN, supra.
73. Council of the State Act, supro note 3, art. 66
74. Id. This provision does not, of course, exclude the jurisdiction of administrative. It
applies only if the concerned governments' deputies decide to refer the dispute to the above
mentioned general board. Having chosen this course of action, the court's legal opinion is
authoritative and obligatory upon both government units. But, if one of the government units
involved in a dispute prefers to raise the issue before the administrative law court, the court's
jurisdiction is then invoked. It must decide the issue before it, See supr, text accompanying
note 21.
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C. The Legislative Division
The Legislative Division of the Council is managed in a similar way.
Councilors or assistant councilors are employed in the various units of this
division. These units are located in the various ministries and public
authorities. A legislative units duty is to prepare and formulate legislative
proposals suggested by the concerned government units to be introduced
before the National Assembly. The unit is authorized to formulate
regulatory proposals for implementing existing acts and prepare and
formulate decisions of a judicial character for the president of the
republic."
Jurisdictional conflicts that may arise between ordinary courts of
justice and courts of the Council are to be solved by a special independent
court duly established for this purpose.
76 
The High Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine such jurisdictional conflicts." The Court also has
exclusive authority to judge claims concerning the constitutionality of Acts
of Parliament.
78
D. Evaluation and History
Egyptian jurists favor this bilateral judicial system for several reasons.
Advocates of the administrative judicial system argue that acts of public
administration that are discharged by a public authority in its capacity as
a public power differ fundamentally from business transactions of the
government and private activities. In the former case, public authorities are
equipped with certain powers that enable them to operate public services
without hinderance. Private citizens and contractors are not equivalent to
government authorities when one of the former is a party in an administra-
tive governmental activity. Government authorities have certain privileges
and powers that parties in business activities are not entitled to possess.
Private activities, as opposed to public transactions, are conducted between
equal parties that have similar rights and responsibilities. Furthermore,
certain restrictions may be imposed upon government authorities as a
means of securing good services.
75. Council of the State Act, supr note 3, art. 45.
76. High Court Act, No. 81 (1969) (Egypt).
77. Id. art. 4-4.
78. Id. art 4-1. Constitutional claims can be reviewed only before the High Court. See
PE ANNT CONST. OFTHE ARAB Rn'UiC OFEGYPT. Although previous constitutions concerning
this issue were silent, he permanent constitution adds a further constitutional basis to the parent
Act.
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Supporters of the bilateral judicial system also maintain that govem-
mental acts must be distinguished from private transactions. The former
activities have certain characteristics. They are connected with public
utilities and government services. These services must be delivered
regularly and without stoppage or further delay. They should be delivered
to the citizens on an equal basis and without discrimination. Government
services, including social services, are provided for those who are qualified.
Those who oversee these services should have certain powers to maintain
these vital services. Their activities are also subject to public scrutiny.
Government officials operate activities that are financed by the public
through taxes and levies. The public, through their representatives, should
be allowed to supervise these activities. In order to achieve this purpose,
certain restrictions may be imposed on public officials through acts of
parliament. Private transactions, however, are financed by individuals and
private agencies. Their activities are not directly connected with public
utilities. Owners of private enterprises owe no obligations to the people
except for self-imposed requirements which may allow them more profit.
Objectives of these activities and the principles governing them and their
characteristics, therefore, may be fundamentally different from those of
public activities.
Disputes arising out of government activities, therefore, should be
resolved by special judges that are close to the government departments
and who are familiar with government activities and requirements. Unlike
ordinary judges, an administrative law judge can view the administrative
dispute before him in a broad and pragmatic perspective. The determina-
tion, therefore, will not be rigid and will allow for the smooth running of
government. Arguably, an administrative law judge can strike a fair
balance between the government's interest in conducting public services
without undue hinderance and the citizen's interest in having the case
decided by an independent judge that will not sacrifice the citizen's vital
interests. Establishment of independent administrative courts is a mere
application of the principles of job-specialization and job-classification,
which should be followed by the judiciary.
Furthermore, administrative courts are more capable of invalidating
acts of public administration than are ordinary courts. Since they are
connected with government and trusted by it, administrative courts may set
aside capricious acts of public administration. Administrative courts are
confident that the government will not accuse them, as it might accuse
ordinary courts, of hindering government activities.
Nevertheless, a judicial system's effectiveness should be viewed in
light of its achievements and successes. A judicial legal system may be
considered efficient if its advantages outweigh its disadvantages. In
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addition, a judicial legal system is likely to be a viable, efficient system if
it is deeply rooted in the constitutional, political, and social background of
the society. Furthermore, bilateral judicial systems were not originally
adopted for efficiency, fairness, and professional reasons. On the contrary,
bilateral judicial systems were originally based upon historical and political
considerations.' Efficiency and professional considerations emerged later.
After complex and long developments, these defenses have emerged in
place of political and historical reasons.
The bilateral judicial system is one of the main by-products of the
French Revolution of 1789.' Its political leaders charged the overthrown
political system, inter alia, with corruption and resistance to change and
reform. They emphatically criticized parliaments for their role during the
previous regime.
t 
Parliaments were held responsible for corruption and
lack of efficiency in public service. The leaders of the Revolution
maintained that parliaments interfered with government activities and
hindered reform proposals. Parliaments, which possessed the power to
approve or disapprove government proposals, had placed great obstacles
before the government to prevent or delay the passage of those proposals.
They refused to accept government proposals and purposely delayed
projects vital to the interest of the state.?
Political leaders confronted the judiciary with these charges and
declared that the executive branch would be independent of the judiciary.
Government activities would be managed by the executive without
interference or hinderance by the judges. Thus, government disputes
would be resolved by government officials, not by judges of the judicial
branch of the state.0 The new regime initially stated that further interfer-
ence with government activities was considered a great felony against the
state and the principles of the Revolution.' Government disputes were
referred to public officials and ministers for resolution.' Certain
79. AsD EL-PArrAH HASSAN, LEcru s ON ADMINSTRATVE LAW, THE INSrTIUTE OF Pusuc
ADMINISTRATION 11 -12 (1980). The author sates that this system was originally adopted by the
fathers of the 1789 French Revolution for historical and political considerations. Id.
80. Id.
81. Parliaments in France, at that time, discharged the judicial tnction of the State.
Parliament of Paris was considered as a court of the monarch. For a detailed discussion upon
the different legal systems of the world, see generally Rone DAVID & JOHN E. BRIFRLEY, MAJOR
LEOAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (3rd ed. 1985).
82. HASSAN, supra note 79, at 11-12.
83. Id.
84. J.R. GARNER, ADMINISTRAnVE LAW 13 (5th ed. 1979).
85. HASSAN, supra note 79, at 11-12.
1991]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & CoMP. L.
committees subsequently were established within the executive branch to
solve government disputes.
86 
Those committees reported their opinions to
the administration. Their opinions constituted advice presented to the
government for consideration. They were of no legal effect unless they
were approved by the administration. 7
The new leadership was faced with the fact that they had become
judges in their own cause. This conclusion ran contrary to the principle of
separation of powers, which was advocated by their supporters in reaction
to the abuses of the previous regime. The doctrine initially used by the
new regime now served as a counter weapon against it. As far as public
administration disputes were concerned, it appeared that the executive
branch had usurped the function of the judiciary. The doctrine of
separation of powers88 implies that litigation must be resolved by an
independent judiciary-not by the party to the dispute (that is, the execu-
tive).
The new regime was faced with a dilemma of its own creation and
solved it by developing its own legal experiment. French politicians did
not resort to the previous judicial system. Instead, they developed their
new experiment and built upon it." They tried, however, to avoid serious
charges against the new legal system.
The French version concerning judicial review of administrative action
is distinct and unique, and many countries were influenced by it" The
French pyramid of the administrative judicial system is now complete. A
comprehensive judicial system has gradually emerged within the executive
branch of the state. There are different levels of administrative courts
86. Id.
87. Id.
8& The American version concerning this question is wholly different Ordinmy courts re
entrusted with the burden of solving disputes including public administration ones. Their duty
is related to the interpretation of statutes. The Executive must implement them. The laer is
not entitled to interpret acts or solve disputes. On the subject of separation of powers, see
generally STANLEY DESMri's, JUDICIAL REVIEW OFADMOISTRATIVE ACTION 3-10 (4th ad. 1980);
GARNER, supr note 84, at 13-17; D. FOULKES, INIRODUCIION To ADmJNIsiRAVE LAW 1-12 (4th ed,
1979); JOHN4 D. McctLL, CONsmT=I.ONAL AW 40-50 (2nd ed. 1968); H. P1ILIs, CoNeivTLoNAL
AND ADIdlMlSTRATIVE LAW 14-16 (6th ad. 1978); EeMLN C. WADE & ALEXANDER W. BRADLEY,
CONSITI~nONAL AND ADMlSTRATIVE LAW 47-59 (10th ed. 1985); P.. Millward,JdieiolRevew
ofAdministratie Authority in Canada, 39 CAN. B REV. 351-95 (1961); The Presidency and
Congress Constitutionally Separated and Shared Powers: A Federalist Society Symposium,
68 WASH. U. L.Q. 485 (1990); see also infra note 130.
89. HASSAN, supra note 79, at 11-12.
90. Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon ore among the leading Middle East countries that have
followed the French judicial pattern. Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco also follow this system.
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analogous to those of ordinary courts.
9 The independence of these courts
has been formally maintained since 1872.' The Council of the State and
its apparatus has ascertained its role in supervising acts of public adminis-
tration and maintaining the citizen's rights." The Court of Conflict is
entrusted with solving jurisdictional disputes which may well arise between
ordinary and administrative courts in this bilateral judicial system.
"
Bilateral" judicial systems, however, do not escape criticism.
Complexity, discrimination,96 jurisdictional conflict, and costs are only
some of the criticisms that are levelled against them. It should also be
remembered that ordinary courts of justice, as independent courts, have
proven capable of securing individual's rights and liberties against abuses
of power on the part of public authorities. They maintain this purpose
without sacrificing government needs and the public interest. Simplicity,
harmony, economy, openness, and equality are other advantages of this
system. Efficiency is a remarkable achievement of this system. Judges
may be familiar with acts of public administration because these acts are
regularly reviewed by them. Certain public law disputes may be allocated,
if necessary, to a special panel or chamber within an ordinary court.
Furthermore, special courts within the judiciary may be established if the
nature of the work so requires.
In summary, a judicial legal system may be appreciated in light of its
efficiency and its ability to maintain the rule of law and function of
government. Applications of both judicial systems in different countries
may provide examples in which one judicial system or the other proves to
be successful. Other examples may reveal contrary conclusions. In other
words, ajudicial system, in order to be successful, should not be removed
from the context of its environment. It should maintain the vital interests
of the state and the principles of justice.




95. The bilateral judicial system contrasts the unitary judicial system. The latter system is
followed by common law countries, such as the United States of America and the United
Kingdom.
96. This charge is due to the fact that administrative courts may favor the administration and
allow it privileges at the expense of the other party to the dispute, that is, the citizen.
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III. CIVIL SERVICE REGULATORY AUTHORITIES: AN OVERVIEW
A. Civil Servants: Definition and Categories
A public employee is any officer appointed temporarily or permanently
by an authorized public authority in a government ministry, a public
agency, a public corporation, or a local government authority to carry out
government activities directly connected with public utilities.' This
definition indicates that certain conditions must be fulfilled to consider a
public employee a civil servant. For instance, the employee must be
appointed by an authorized officer acting within the limits of the officer's
jurisdiction. Additionally, the employee must be appointed in an office
within the central government, a local government, a public agency, or a
public corporation.' Lastly, the activities should be related to public
services and not to business activities.
Employees of the public sector' are not within the scope of public
service. Public sector employees carry out business activities of the state
in a manner analogous to that of the private sector. They are, therefore,
considered private employees rather than public officers."
The Civil Service Employees Act (the Act) clearly mandates'' that
employees who are temporarily appointed in permanent jobs in a govern-
ment unit are public employees.
t
" The previsions of the Act, therefore,
apply to them."t Nevertheless, not all public employees in the executive
are considered civil servants. Public employees that are explicitly subject
to special acts, but not to the Civil Service Employees Act are not within
the scope of the term "civil servant." Their affairs, including disciplinary
97. See also TAMAWI, supra note 6, at 42-79.
98. See Civil Service Employees Act, supra note 69, art. 2.1. The term government unit will
be used hereinafter to refer to any government ministry, local government authority, public
corporation, or public agency.
99. The term public sector refers to public companies owned and managed by the state. The
public sector emerged in Egypt after the 1952 Revolution. The government converted many
big private companies into public companies owned by the slate. Furthermore, the government
established new public companies to run economic activities such as industry, trade, and
commerce. Employees of public sector companies discharge economical activities of the state
in a business-like manner.
100. Opinion of the General Board for the Legal Opinion Division of the Council, No.
59/l/61.
101. Civil Service Employees Act, supra note 69, art. 13.
102. The term "public employees" used in the Act is synonymous with the tem civil








Civil servants may be classified according to the authority that
employs them as follows: employees of the central government; employees
of independent public agencies" and corporations whose affairs are not
governed by special acts; and employees of local government. l Civil
servants may also be classified according to their ranks. They are
classified into two major categories. The first category is comprised of
officials of the highest category, which includes the deputy minister, the
excellent grade holders, the highest grade holders, and director generals,
whether they are directors within a government unit headquarters, regional
directorates, or directorates not directly connected with the central
govemment.' The second category is classified into six grades."
As far as disciplinary penalties are concerned, specific provisions may
apply to each category of officials. High ranking officials may be
penalized by one of the following penalties: caution, reprimand, discharge,
and dismissal." Penalties that may be imposed upon an official of the
second category are extensive in their scope and number. 0
Civil servants of the highest category and their superiors are consid-
ered disciplinary authorities with respect to officials of the second category.
Their disciplinary power, however, is limited. A high ranking officer is
authorized to impose not more than a month's salary reduction."' The
director of the concerned government unit, however, is authorized to
impose penalties, but not more than a promotion delay penalty. The
director has the authority to impose such penalties upon all offending
officials of the two categories."
104. See Administrative Deputy and Disciplinary Proceedings Act, supra note 4, arts. 33-42.
105. Heads of independent public agencies and corporations ate equal in their official status
in relation to the Ministers status. Central Agency for Management and Administration Act,
No. 118 (1964) (Egypt), amended by Central Agency for Management and Administration Act,
art. 2 (1974) (Egypt).
106. Governors of the different regions of Egypt are equal in their official status, within their
regions, to the Ministers status. Local Government Act, No. 43, art. 27 (1979) (Egypt).
107. Civil service Employees Act, No. 47 (1978) (Egypt), amended by Civil Service
Employees Act, No. 117, art. 8 (1982) (Egypt).
108. id.
109. id. art. 80.
110. ld.
it. Id. art, 82.1.
112. Id. art. 02.2.
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Penalties imposed by these administrative authorities are subject to
review by disciplinary courts whose decisions can be reviewed on appeal
before the High Administrative Court."
3 
Disciplinary decisions of these
administrative authorities cannot be reviewed by disciplinary courts unless
the disciplined officer has exhausted all the administrative appellate
channels.
4 
The disciplined officer should then bring a case before the
disciplinary court within the specified time limit."
5
B. The Central Agency for Management and Administration
In 1964, the Central Agency for Management and Administration"
6
(the Central Agency) replaced its predecessor, the Civil Service Council.
It is an independent public agency, which reports directly to the Council
of Ministers. Its duty is to improve the standards and efficiency of the
civil service and to secure uniform services for citizens with equal
qualifications."
7 
The Central Agency is authorized to supervise govern-
ment units in order to achieve its purposes. It is authorized to suggest,
participate, and lay down general civil service policy issues that should be
carried out by government units."
8
The Central Agency discharges its functions through advisors, through
the Board of Administrative Development, and through its various central
departments and regional offices."
9 
Some of the important functions of the
Central Agency are job classification, on-the-job training, the simplification
of job methods and procedures, and job efficiency evaluation."
°  The
Central Agency is the sole channel through which government units may
seek advice and the legal opinion of the Council concerning the interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the Civil Service Employees Act.'
2
'
The Civil Service Affairs Committee serves as an advisor and
coordinator for the Central Agency concerning civil service activities. Its
113. Id. art. 82.4; see iafra text accompanying notes 118-120.
114. Civil Service Employees Act, supra note 69.
115. Id. art. 8; see Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 12.1.
116. Central Agency for Management and Administration Act, supra note 105, art. 1.
117. id art. 3. This express prevision's intention was "to secure equal services" and to
maintain new values prevailing in Egypt. Duting that period and later, there was much
emphasis placed upon maintaining the good machinery of government by selecting officials
according to their merits and upon an equal basis. TAMAWI, supra note 6, at 41-56,
11. Central Agency for Management and Administration Act, supra note 105, art. 55.
119. Central Agency Presidents Order, No. 24 (1975) (Egypt).
120. Id.
121. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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personnel jurisdiction covers all civil servants governed by the provisions
of the Act. It consists of the director of the Central Agency, who serves
as its chairperson, and other members appointed by virtue of their
offices."
z
The Committee's duties include issuing regulations and orders to
further the implementation of the provisions of the Act, as well as issuing
directives to government units to carry out legal opinions of the Council
concerning civil service issues.123 The committee discharges its functions
under the responsibility of its chairperson, who is authorized to issue a
regulation stating the rules and procedures that shall be followed by the
conunittee.ll
C. The Employees Affairs Committee
The Employees Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over specific civil
service issues exclusively related to specific government units." Its
director is connected with the respective government unit. It is made up
of at least three civil servants, one of which must be a union committee
member. This official must be chosen by the Union Committee Board
within the concerned government unit.
The Committee's duty is to assist the government unit in handling civil
service issues related to appointment, transfer, promotion, and annual salary
increases of officials in the second category.
te 
It is also authorized to
endorse evaluation reports for employees of the second category. In
addition, the Committee should discharge any function assigned to it by the
head of the concerned government unit."' The Committee's functions with
regard to its government unit are closely connected to those of the Civil
Service Affairs Central Committee. Employees Affairs Committee, there-
fore, should act in harmony with the general policy determined by the Civil
Service Affairs Central Committee.
122. Members of the Committee include: the Chainman of the Board of the Legal Opinion
and Legislation Divisions; the head of the Legislative Section of the Council; the Director of
Job Classification Central Administration (the "Central Agency"); the Minister of Finance
Deputy for the State Budget Affairs, and any other deputy minister of the named ministry
chosen by its minister. Civil Service Employees Act, supra note 69, art. 3.
123. Id. art. 3,
124. Id.
125. Id. at. 4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
384 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L. [Vol. 12
The jurisdiction of the Civil Service Affairs and the Employees'
Affairs Committees is wholly restricted to the province of the civil service
rather than to the public sector service province. The latters affairs are
regulated by the High Council for the relevant economic sector and by the
company's board respectively.'
28
D. The Administrative Deputy Agency
The Administrative Deputy Agency (the Agency) has a crucial role in
enhancing job efficiency, curtailing acts of maladministration, and
investigating financial and administrative offenses committed within the
civil service. The Agency also has the power to prosecute the individuals
who engage in these activities. Its primary duty is to control government
activities and to investigate offenses that are committed by officials.'
29 
In
order to fulfill its role, the Agency is exclusively authorized to institute
disciplinary proceedings before disciplinary courts. The Agency carries out
its duties either upon its own initiative during its daily business or upon the
request of a government unit.'
32
The Agency is divided into two basic divisions: control and investiga-
tion.
13
' Each division is subdivided into departments whose jurisdictions
are determined by the president of the republic upon a recommendation of
the director general of the Agency. The Agency is an independent public
authority directly connected with the office of the president of the
republic.'
32 Due to its diverse activities, the Agency also enjoys close
relations with the head of the Central Agency, the minister of justice, and
the minister of the state for the council of ministers affairs.'
33
128. Employees of the Public Sector Act No. 48, arts. 2, 4, 8-10 (1978) (Egypt); see
tooABIM FStAl, EGYI EfcgN yME ,E y SYSnIs IN THE OVS. SnVM ANDE O I PTiLic SBa
(1978). There are, however, many similarities between the provisions of the Civil Service
Employees Act and the provisions of the Employees of the Public Sector Act. td. Ranks and
grades of the employees of the public sector are similar to those in the civil service. Id.
Similarly, rules and procedures concerning disciplinary proceedings are not very much different
in both services. Id.
129. Administrative Deputy and Disciplinaey Proceedings Act, supra note 47, art 3.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Administrative Deputy and Disciplinary Proceedings Act, No. 117, art, 1 (1958)
(Egypt). amended by Administrative Deputy and Disciplinary Proceedings Act, No 183 (1960)
(Egypt)
133. Central Agency for Management and Administration Act, supra note 105, art. 3.
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The Agency is the sole authority empowered to investigate any official
accusation made against any official of the highest category." It has
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate all allegations involving financial
offenses or losses involving the state budget raised against any civil
servant, regardless of the rank or grade of the civil servant.
35 
Supervisors
of an accused official are deprived of any power to investigate. The
director of the concerned government unit must immediately refer the case
to the Agency to investigate and to take the necessary course of action."
Nevertheless, if the Agency recommends to the concerned government
unit that no further action should be taken upon the case at issue or if it
recommends a certain penalty and the director of the concerned govern-
ment unit is not satisfied with the Agency's course of action, the director
may again refer the case to the Agency to institute disciplinary proceedings
against the accused official.
13 
If this is the case, the Agency must raise
the dispute before the disciplinary court for its further consideration.
38
In cases that do not require by law that investigations must be carried
out by the Agency, the Agency is authorized to institute legal proceedings
if it finds that the penalty imposed upon the offending officer by his
superior is insufficient in light of the seriousness of the offense.'
39
As far as instituting proceedings and prosecution before disciplinary
courts is concerned, the Agency has exclusive jurisdiction, without any
limitations, to carry out this duty.'
4 
Any proceedings instituted before a
disciplinary court upon the initiative of any authority other than the
Agency, or any proceedings carried out in the absence of the Agency's
representative, are considered to be invalid. The continuing presence of the
Agency in these proceedings, therefore, is a prerequisite for the legitimacy










140. Administrative Deputy and Disciplinary Proceedings Act, supra note 47, art. 4.
141. On the subject of "disciplinary action" in the United States of Amerira, see Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loadennill, 470 U.S. 532 (1984); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 110 S.Ct.
2729 (1990); Egon Guttman, The Development and Exercise of Appellate Power in Adverse
Action Appeals, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (
19 7 0
); Theodore C. Hir, Union Presence in
Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (1974); Thomas K. Houston, Due Process and
Public Employment in Perspective: Arbitrary Dismissals of Non-Civil Service Employees, 19
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L.
E. Evaluation
The Central Agency is entrusted with the overall responsibility of
regulating civil service affairs. Its director is assisted by committees whose
members include judicial representatives and employees' union members.
Civil service employees are allowed to join unions with their counterparts
in the public and the private sectors. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
determine whether public employees may have a role in determining civil
service policies. These policies are unilaterally determined by the
administration.
The expansion of the public sector in Egypt has encouraged jurists to
suggest that rules regulating the affairs of the civil service and the public
sector should be identical and uniform.
14 
As a result of efforts that have
been made by the legislature, changes have been introduced to regulate the
affairs of employment in both systems. However, it is difficult to say
whether the same legal rules will apply to both sectors of employment.
The bilateral judicial system, by its very nature, implies that certain rules
should be applied to civil servants rather than to employees of the public
sector.
Constant changes in the regulation of the affairs of the civil service
may lead to lack of clarity, confusion, and uncertainty. Projects for
administrative reform have led sometimes to complexity and interaction
among different regulatory authorities.
14 
It would seem, however, that
there is a growing tendency to give the Council of the State a steady hand
in regulating the affairs of the civil service. Civil service affairs are
managerial and should be discharged by administrators who possess
discretion in handling the affairs of the civil service. Therefore, in the best
interests of an efficient administration, this emerging trend should not
UCLA L. REv. 1052 (1972); Richard Johnson & Richard G. Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal
Employee Dismissals and Other Adverse Actions, 57 CORNELL . REv. 178 (1972); William V.
Luneburg, The Federal Personnel Complaint, Appeal and Grievance Systems: A Structural
Overview and Proposed Revisions, 78 KY. L.J. 1 (1990); Richard A. Merrill, Procedures for
Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REv. 196 (1973); Fredrich H.
Thoimforde, Controlling Administratve Sanctions, 74 MicH. L. REv. 709 (1976); Robet P.
Williams,Administrative Law,41 MERCER L. REV. 1173 (1990); Symposium, Application ofthe
Constitutional Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dismissals from Public Employment, Student
Symposium, 5 DUKE L.J. 1037 (1973); ROBRT G. VAUGHN, PIsIJNLEs OF Civs. SEnviCE LAW, 5.1-
5.36 (1979).
142. See TAMAWi, supra note 6, at 42-43.
143. Therm is overlapping among the activities of the Administrative Deputy Agency, the
Attorney General, the Accountancy Council, the Central Agency, and the various ministries of
the state. See supra text accompanying note 50, 97.
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exceed the boundaries of reason. Flexibility is a fundamental element that
ensures the smooth running of government activities.
IV. THE COUNCIL AND ITS OVERSIGHT ROLE OVER
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS: APPRAISAL AND PRACTICAL ANALYSIS
The Council's judicial division has ultimate and exclusive jurisdiction
to review disciplinary actions imposed upon civil servants by disciplinary
authorities.'" Furthermore, disciplinary courts within the Council are
disciplinary authorities for serious disciplinary actions. 45 Disciplinary
courts and administrative disciplinary authorities discharge their judicial
function under the overall supervision of the High Administrative Court
(the "Cour"). The determinations ofadministrative disciplinary authorities
are reviewed by respective disciplinary courts. The decisions of the
disciplinary authorities and the penalties imposed by the courts are then
subject to review before the High Administrative Court.
As an appellate court, the High Administrative Court is authorized to
review disciplinary courts' decisions and to quash them if they are found
to be contrary to law. 4' The High Administrative Court is additionally
authorized to quash a disciplinary court's decision if it finds that the
decision was not supported by evidence.' 7 It may also strike a court's
decision if the penalty is found to be unreasonable in comparison to the
seriousness of the official's offense."a
The Court may not, however, inquire into the conclusion'49 reached by
a disciplinary court if the latter's conclusion was supported by evidence
duly contained in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court may allow
disciplinary courts discretion to choose a suitable penalty for the offense
committed as long as the penalty is balanced and not excessive."'
This supervisory role of the Court may lead to harmony in disciplinary
courts' rulings and to stability and consistency concerning disciplinary
issues. Moreover, this settled disciplinary policy may further the workings
of administration and improve job security within the civil service.
144. See supr text accompanying note 21.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 120.
146. See supra text acompaoying note 38.
147. See AHIED M. JONAH, DISCIPLINARY COURTS DISPUTES 51 (1984),
148. 7 High Administrative Court No. 563 (1961).
149. 14 High Administrative Court No. 644 (1969).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
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It is striking, however, that the structure of the disciplinary system is
highly irregular. Minimal penalties imposed by administrative authorities
may be reviewed at three levels. A disciplinary penalty may be reviewed
by a supervisor's director," The director may amend, reverse, or quash
the subordinate's decision. In some cases, however, the director is only
authorized to endorse or to quash the disciplinary decision-not to amend
the penalty decision." 2 A disciplinary determination by the concerned
administrative authority is subject to disciplinary court review. Its decision
may be reviewed on appeal by the Court.
In contrast, only one appellate avenue is available for penalties
imposed by disciplinary courts. These decisions can be reviewed only by
the Court."' Such penalties can be far reaching and include discharge and
dismissal." 4 It is for this reason that further appellate channels should be
available with regard to serious disciplinary actions. In order to foster job
security and to enhance a healthy environment within the civil service, it
is necessary to provide civil servants with further guarantees, which may
reduce the possibility of error on the part of disciplinary courts.
The Egyptian disciplinary legal system, however, does provide civil
servants with substantial safeguards. Important disciplinary cases are
determined by independent courts."' Investigation in these cases, and in
others, is carried out by a neutral authority-not by the accused official's
supervisors."
6 
This procedure may influence disciplinary authorities to
discharge their discretion without excess or abuse.
7 It is hoped that such
procedures will not be at the expense of job effectiveness and the efficient
functioning of the administration.
151. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, arts. 11.9, 12; see also Civil Seevice Employees
Act. supra note 134, art. 82.1.
152. General Board for Legal Opinion and Legislation Divisions (1969) (Egypt).
153. Council of the State Act, supra note 3, art. 22.
154. Id. art 19.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 111.
156. See supra text accompanying note 101.
157. The ase of discretion in the disciplinary process is as essential as the abuse of discretion
is intolerable. The High Administrative Court in its review policy should strike a good
supervisory policy according to which guarantees to the employees as well as civil service
effectiveness can be maintained. See generally D.1 GALUGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL
STUDY Or OFciAL DIScETION (1986); George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 5 Duke L.
J. 747 (1986); Charles H. Koch. Judicial Review of Admitistrotive Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV- 469 (1986); Ronald M. Levin, Administrativ Discretion, Judicial Review, and the
Gloomy World ofJudge Smith, 2 DUKE L.J. 258 (1986); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 167 (1975)
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Disciplinary penalties should not be imposed upon innocent officials.
An offense without legal justification' must be committed by an official
before legal proceedings may be initiated. The Council stated that a
disciplinary action should be based upon a disciplinary offense committed
by an accused official. Otherwise, a disciplinary penalty is not authorized
and should be set aside. 9 It is contrary to law to impose a penalty other
than those expressly stated in the enabling legislation. 60 An offending
official should not be punished for an offense by more than one penalty at
a time.'
6
' If the official was so penalized, the respective court may
determine the suitable penalty and quash the others.'
6
' Furthermore,
penalties should not be imposed again upon an official if no new offense
was committed.
63
The Council made it abundantly clear that a disciplinary action cannot
stand unless it was discharged by an authorized official."a Delegation in
disciplinary matters is not allowed in the absence of express provisions to
this effect.'
The Court will allow a claim that was made by a disciplinary court
other than the one authorized to have jurisdiction over the case at issue.
This defense may be raised by an interested official. It may also be raised
by the Court, sua sponte. Such a contention is considered a matter of sub-
158. For example, an official may be exempted from a penalty if proven mentally ill. The
official might be discharged from ay official liability if it was proven that the official carried
out the act in compliance with a supervisors orders which must be obeyed. See Civil Service
Employees Act, art. 13 (1978) (Egypt).
159. 13 High Administrative Court No. 775 (1969).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 84, 169; see also 19 High Administrative Court No,
884 (1978).
161. 3 High Administrative Court No. 686 (1957).
162. HANBAL, supro note 128.
163. 8 High Administrative Court No. 708 (1974).
164. FAIM IZZAT, DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ADMINISiRATIVE AND
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 237 (1980).
165. 12 High Administrative Court No. 1322(1970); see also ABDEL-WAHAB EL-BANDARI,
DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION AND DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES, 69-80; IZZAT, supra not 164,
On delegation in general, see generally BW. Coyer, Administrative Law, 36 WAYNE L.
REV. 239 (1990); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional
Delegaiions of Adminisrratice Authority Outside the Federal Gorernment, 85 NW. U. L. REV
62 (1990); D. Milion, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219
(1988).
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stance.'" It can be raised at any time as long as there was no final
decision upon the case.
7
An official has committed an offense if the action was contrary to the
explicit duties of the official or if it was prohibited by law. "' An official's
act may also be considered an offense if it was contrary to the require-
ments of public office"
9 and the prevailing values within Egyptian
society.'
7
' The Council asserted that official offenses include acts that may
inflict harm upon the reputation of the civil service. Such acts may be
judged by the disciplinary authority in light of social values, customs, and
the prevailing circumstances.'
The Council also ascertained that an act of a civil servant may be
considered an offense even if it was committed outside of work.'" It
would be an offense if the act was considered unethical or if it adversely
affected the reputation of the civil servant and job requirements.
The Council, however, distinguished between subordinate officials and
high ranking officials with respect to acts ofmisconduct. It held that while
an act of a subordinate official may not be unethical under some circum-
stances, it might be considered improper if committed by a high ranking
official.'
73
The Council also held that, whereas acts of misconduct must bejudged
in accordance with the prevailing values within Egyptian society, they must
not be viewed in the light of values prevailing in foreign environments.
74
The Court repudiated a decision that held that an official's conduct outside
work is a personal matter. The Court ascertained that the official's conduct
was unethical. The official should have behaved properly and in harmony
with prevailing values.'
166. 23 High Administrative Court No. 501 (1983).
167. d
168. Civil Service Employees Act of 1978, supra note 69, art. 80.
169. Id. art. 78.
170. Id.; se also 14 High Administrative Court No. 991 (1973).
171. I Disciplinary Court for the Ministry of Health, No. 5; 15 High Administrative Court
No. 343 (1970).
172. 15 High Adminislrative Court No. 244(1973); HANABAL, supranote 128 (citing 15High
Admiotrative Court No. 244 (1973)).
173. 22 General Board for Legal Opinion and Legislation, No. 78 (1968) (Egypt); see
TAMAWI, supra note 6, at 246. In this 0e the subordinate official was accused of taking drugs
in his private life. ld It was contended that such an act was improper. [d.
174. MUSTAFA AFI, DISCIPLINARY PENALTIES: RATIONALE AND OBJECTS 508 (1976).
175. Id.; see also 13 High Administrative Court No. 328 (1969).
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Nevertheless, acts of misconduct are not enumerated."' It is, there-
fore, left to the disciplinary authority to decide whether an act lies inside
or outside the boundaries of good conduct. A disciplinary authority may
decide the proper penalty to be imposed as a result of an act of miscon-
duct. However, it is now settled that a disciplinary authority's decision
may be quashed by the concerned court if the penalty was found excessive
in relation to the seriousness of the offense."'
Administrative courts review disciplinary actions with considerable
care in order to maintain fair procedures and to protect innocent officials
against abuses of discretion on the part of a disciplinary authority. An
official should be afforded a full opportunity to be heard before a disciplin-
ary decision is made."' Investigation should be carried out formally."'
It should be made in writing, except in cases that do not exceed three days
reetuction in salary penalty. 80 In the latter case, reasons for such a penalty
should be disclosed. A summary of an official's claims should be clearly
stated in the disciplinary decision."' Failure to state reasons for a disci-
plinary decision renders it invalid."2 Accordingly, it may be quashed by
the concerned court."'
Investigation, however, is not always required." If the accused
official refused to attend the investigation"5 or if the case was criminal,
thereby causing the accused to be investigated in criminal proceedings,"'
a claim by the accused official that his case was not investigated will not
stand. Furthermore, the official's claim may not be sustained by the Court
if the official contended that the investigation was defective. The official
should have raised the contention before the respective disciplinary court
and not before the High Administrative Court."' On the other hand, a
disciplinary decision may be sustained even if the investigatory proceed -
176. 7 High Administrative Court No. 27 (1961),
177. 19 High Administrative Court No. 10 (1975).
178. Civil Service Employees Act, supra nole 69, art. 81
179. Id. art 79.
180. Id.; 13 High Administrative Court No. 451 (1973).
ISL Id.
182. Id.
183. 13 High Administrative Court No. 451 (1973).
184. Civil Service Employees Act, supra nose 69, art 79.
185. 21 High Administrative Court No. 22 (1977).
186. Id.
187. 14 High Administrative Court No. 644 (1969).
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ings were lost, provided that the decision was based upon proven facts
contained in the file of the disciplinary proceedings.
1
The disciplinary authority should base its decision on correct and
relevant facts." Reasons for its decision should be clearly stated. There
should be no contradiction between them.tt The respective court may,
however, rely upon hearsay evidence and upon witnesses' claims disclosed,
but not under oath, if it reached its conclusion from proven facts contained
in file proceedings.'' The court may not be required to accept additional
documents unless they were necessary to the court's decision and their
presence may influence the court.'"
The Court, in its rulings, clearly states that disciplinary actions are
distinct from criminal ones.
9
' Disciplinary actions are raised against civil
servants within the civil service to eliminate offenses that may adversely
affect job efficiency. A criminal action may be raised against an offender
who commits a crime against society and public order. Disciplinary
actions, therefore, should be based upon civil law provisions, and not those
of criminal law. A disciplinary act justified upon a criminal law provision,
therefore, was held invalid.
1
"
Disciplinary authorities, including disciplinary courts, are not required
to suspend disciplinary proceedings if criminal proceedings are initiated
against an accused official.
9 The concerned disciplinary authority may
continue its proceedings and it may decide the case. A disciplinary
authority may also impose a penalty upon an accused official even if the
latter was vindicated in a criminal proceeding.
t
" What may constitute an
official offense might not be considered a criminal one. Nevertheless, the
Court roled that an accused official should not be disciplined if the
accusation raised against him before a criminal court was not prven."
The disciplinary decision in that case was based on false grounds.
188. 7 High Administrative Court No. 763 (1963).
189. JOMAH, supra note 147.
190. Id. at 44.
191. Id. at 41-44.
192. 19 High Administrative Court No. 629 (1981).
193. 4 High Administrative Court No. 458 (1958).
194. 7 High Administrative Court No. 1330 (1963).
195. 12 High Administrative Court No. 532 (1967).
196. 17 High Administrative Court No. 5410 (1973).
197. Id.; see also Tamawi, snpra note 6, at 262-64.
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It should be noted, however, that an official's act may constitute an
official offense as well as a criminal one."' In such cases, the offending
official may be disciplined by the disciplinary authority even if he was
given a criminal sentence. In certain criminal cases, an offending official
may be jailed. If he received a prison sentence, the penalized official may
be discharged from service without any further action.' In this situation,
discharge is a collateral penalty.' The discharged official is not entitled
to have his case reviewed before a disciplinary court."
°
A disciplinary court has jurisdiction over acts of discharge or dismissal
carried out in disciplinary proceedings. The Court also stated that
disciplinary courts are entitled to entertain only disciplinary claims. Claims
against adverse actions, other than disciplinary ones, are not within the
purview of disciplinary courtsa Therefore, claims against evaluation
reports, according to which an official's salary or promotion was delayed,
are not within the province of disciplinary courts.' Such decisions may,
however, be reviewed by the administrative judicial court since they are
administrative decisions made by public authorities.' Termination of an
official's service on the grounds that he was absent from his work without
justifiable reasons,
5 
or on the grounds that he duly resigned,m can be
raised before the administrative judicial court, but not before the disciplin-
ary courts. These actions are managerial actions rather than disciplinary
ones. The Court has repeatedly ascertained that managerial acts, even if
they involve adverse consequences, are not within the purview of
disciplinary courts.'
Explicit disciplinary penalties only are within the jurisdiction of
disciplinary courts.' If an adverse action was taken against an official
and it was not within the penalties's stated in the enabling legislation,
198. 10 High Administrative Court No. 1433 (1965).
199. Civil Service Employees Act, supra note 69, arts. 94-97,
200. General Board of the Council of the State Opinion, No. 114 (1964) (Egypt).
201. Id.
202. 15 High Administrative Court No. 49 (1965); see Ann, supra note 175, at 85,
203. 4 Judicial Administration Council No. 418 (1950); see also JOMAH, supra note 147.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 33.
205. 19 High Administrative Court No. 295 (1974).
206. Council of the State Act supra note 3, art. 10.
207. 11 High Administrative Court No. 514, 232 (1967).
208. See supro text accompanying note 42.
209. See supra text accompanying note 44; see also 7 High Administrative Court No. 859
(1962).
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disciplinary courts are not the proper avenue for redress. The official
should raise his case before the administrative judicial court.
Official resignation during the course of disciplinary proceedings,
however, will not be allowed to defeat the jurisdiction of a disciplinary
court. A claim by the respective administrative authority to withdraw
disciplinary proceedings may not be accepted by a disciplinary court.
Despite such claims, a disciplinary court's jurisdiction remains intact, and
a final decision on the subject matter may be reached."
0
However, it is not legally defensible for an official to contend that he
committed his act without knowing it was prohibited." It is also not a
valid defense to contend that an act was justified on the grounds that no
legislative prohibition existed if the act violated an administrative custom
followed by the concerned ministry.
1 2 
Neither is it a valid defense for an
accused official to maintain that he discharged his act according to the
prevailing administrative traditions if it was proven that such an act was
contrary to law."
3 
The official cannot validly contend that he committed





it justified by law to contend that an unlawful act discharged by an accused
official was assigned to him by an invalid act.
21 5
Neither negligence nor good faith can absolve an accused official from
his responsibilities."
6 
It may be argued that lack of competence as well as
misinterpretation of legislation constitute official offenses. One may,
however, be inclined to believe that only gross inefficiency should
constitute an official offense. Mistakes may be committed by a reasonable
official when he interprets a legislative provision related to his work.
2 17
Moreover, a wrongful act may occur as a result of lack of training on the
210. 15 High Administrative Court No. 963 (1973).
211. 12 High Administrative Court No. 122 (1966); see also Civil Service Employees Act,
supra note 69, art. 76.
212. See supra text accompanying note 136.
21'. See sapra text accompanying note 113
214. IZZAT, supr- note 64.
215. 8 High Administrative Cour No. 123 (1962).
216. In the context of negligence theory, fault amounts to a showing of han caused by an
official whose conduct fell below the standard of reasonable care for someone engaging in the
activity that led to an injury of the public interest or to an individual. See generally Samuel
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by FederalAdministrative Agencies, 98 YALE
L.J. 679 (1980); William V. Luneburg, Petitioning Federal Agencies For Ralemaking: An
Overview of Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommendation for Improvement,
Ws L REV. 1 (1988X Pstt L SttAoss At  MnoectN Th AsitsntATnVn JucE IN me UNMEr
STATES 271-86 (1989).
217. 12 High Administrative Court No. 1106 (1973).
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part of an accused official. These actions should not be viewed as
disciplinary offenses that can be cured only by disciplinary penalties. A
disciplinary penalty should be rationally employed. It should not be used
to threaten innocent officials. On-the-job training programs can reduce
lack of competence on their part.
Nevertheless, gross inefficiency should not be sustained.
2 8 Officials
who are charged with such an offense should be subject to disciplinary
actions as a consequence. Negligence should also be considered an official
offense that is not justifiable.
219
The jurisdiction of a disciplinary court includes all matters pertaining
to disciplinary issues. Thus, compensation'
2 
claims arising out of
disciplinary actions are within the jurisdiction of disciplinary courts.
22
'
Compensation claims may be raised directly or indirectly. The affected
person can independently raise his monetary claim before the concerned
disciplinary court. He should prove that his injuries were caused by the
illegal penalty imposed on him.
m 
Nevertheless, compensation may not be
awarded for a dismissed official if the dismissal penalty was quashed and
he was instead given another one.2
3 
In such a case an official was not
vindicated, but, rather, he was penalized by a lesser penalty since the
original penalty was found to be excessive and unbalanced. Generally
speaking, compensation claims against invalid disciplinary decisions may
be limited to moral rather than monetary compensation. Declaring a
disciplinary action invalid and striking it down may be appropriate
compensation."
In summary, the Council has an ultimate role in policing administra-
tive acts of public administration. It has an exclusive role in reviewing
disciplinary actions raised against civil servants. It can strike down invalid
disciplinary acts and provide monetary compensation for the injured official
as well.
218. See FIixA. NIRO &LLOYD G. NIGRO, MODERN PuLic ADMINISRATION413-14 (1973);
TE NEW PEoic PERsoNst- ADMINISTRATION 56-86 (1986); CaS R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency
Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 653 (1985).
219. Jomah, supra note 147; cf TAMAWI, sUpra note 6, at 76.
220. As far as governmental tort liability is concerned, see generally George A. Benrnann,
Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1175 (1977); P.L.
SIRAUss, AN Itoaico To ADMrlsRATvE JUSTIC N THE UNrTED STAlEs 271-86 (199 see aa,
RoEiNSON, supra note 216.
221. 2 High Administrative Court No. 9 (1972).
222. 23 High Administrative Court No. 426 (1978).
223. JOMAH, sUpra note 147, at 51.
224. Id. at 124.
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Furthermore, disciplinary courts are entrusted with the burden of
imposing disciplinary penalties, including dismissal and discharge. They
perform the latter function in their capacity as disciplinary authorities.
Their decisions may be reviewed by the High Administrative Court. The
Council's disciplinary decisions are of far reaching importance. Its
disciplinary policy should enhance job security and the operation of
administration.
The Egyptian legislative disciplinary system, however, is undergoing
constant change.
tm 
It has shifted from a purely administrative system in
its character to an almost judicial system. Nevertheless, this legislative
policy appears to be far from stable. Certain gaps in legislative pro-
nouncements should be cured. Further channels of appeal should be open
to civil servants, and efficiency policy should be enhanced.
V. CONCLUSION
The Egyptian civil service system adheres principally to a judicial
disciplinary pattern. The judicial elements in this system clearly outweigh
the administrative ones. Disciplinary courts within the Council discharge
disciplinary functions as if they were administrative authorities. Serious
official offenses must be directly challenged before respective disciplinary
courts. The concerned administrative authority has no power to impose
serious disciplinary penalties.
Furthermore, investigation of financial as well as important official
offenses and accusations against high ranking officials must be discharged
by an independent semi-judicial authority. The Administrative Deputy
Agency, through its staff, is entrusted with this burden.
-
Prosecution before disciplinary courts is the exclusive duty of the
agency. Such serious penalties can be reviewed only before the High
Administrative Court.
7 These penalties may include demotion in salary,
demotion in grade, demotion in both grade and salary, discharge from
office, and dismissal?
8 
Lesser penalties may be imposed by the accused
official's superior. These penalties may be reviewed by the superior's
supervisor. The latter's decision may also be reviewed by the respective
disciplinary court. A court's decision may be reviewed on appeal before
the High Administrative Court.
225. IZZAT, supra note 64; HANBAL, supra note 128.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
228. Id.
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The existing disciplinary structure abounds with complexity. It may
also involve further expense to the state. Delay in handling disciplinary
issues is one of its characteristics. Public administration authorities are not
frmly involved in disciplinary proceedings. Civil servants, also, need
further protection. Officials accused with serious offenses must be given
more than one channel for redress. The role of the Central Agency for
Management and Administration should be strengthened so that its
authority extends beyond matters of formality to civil service matters of
substance.
Administrative authorities should be allowed disciplinary powers
concerning their subordinates. Their disciplinary powers must be carried
out under the supervision of the administrative courts of the Council.
Investigation should be discharged, not by an independent semi-judicial
agency established especially for this purpose, but by neutral administrative
authorities within the structure of the civil service. Disciplinary councils
for officials of different categories should be established to review
disciplinary actions imposed by officials' superiors. The council's decisions
should be reviewed by the Central Agency. These suggestions will not
undermine the supervisory role of the Council of the State. Its jurisdiction
remains intact. However, penalty decisions will be imposed by administra-
tive authorities under the supervisory role of the Council. Duplication,
overlapping, and complexity will be replaced, as a consequence, by clarity,
simplicity, and efficiency. Fairness to public employees will be maintained
through additional channels of appeal and through the Council's superviso-
ry role.

